Aidynov T., Satybaldina D., Abisheva G., Egamberdiyev E.
A Parameterizable Research Framework for Electronic Voting Based on Cryptographic Protocols and Blockchain Audit // Cryptography. — 2026. — Vol. 10, No. 3. — Art. 34. — DOI: 10.3390/cryptography10030034.

Abstract: Electronic voting requires the simultaneous admission of only legitimate participants, ballot uniqueness, vote confidentiality, storage integrity, and result verifiability. Blockchain alone does not solve these problems, since ledger immutability does not guarantee anonymity, ballot correctness, or reduced trust concentration. The purpose of this work is to develop a parameterizable research framework for electronic voting scenarios with enhanced cryptographic protection, allowing the security level to be varied according to the requirements of a voting scenario. The main contribution of the work is a parameterizable research architecture for composing and experimentally comparing electronic voting configurations with different security and computational profiles. The cryptographic and audit mechanisms integrated into this architecture include blind-signature-based anonymous authorization, encrypted ballot submission, blockchain-style audit, receipt verification, homomorphic tally publication, and threshold-supported tally artifacts. These mechanisms are not proposed as new cryptographic primitives; rather, they are integrated into a reproducible prototype to study how their combination affects verifiability, privacy support, auditability, and computational cost. Compared with basic blockchain-based voting prototypes, this architecture explicitly separates security, privacy, and verifiability profiles and makes their computational cost observable. The implemented prototype is used as an experimental platform for analyzing supported security properties, threat modeling, and computational cost estimation. The results show that authentication, anonymous token issuance, and receipt verification maintain an almost constant cost at the studied scale, while the main cryptographic burden is associated with encrypted ballot submission and threshold-supported tally publication. The scientific novelty of the work lies in constructing a parameterizable architecture that integrates several cryptographic mechanisms and a blockchain audit layer into one reproducible research prototype. At the same time, the proposed approach retains prototype-level limitations associated with the absence of a full zero-knowledge proof stack, independently deployed threshold authorities, and coercion-resistance mechanisms.

Keywords: 

electronic voting; cryptographic protocols; blockchain; blind signature; homomorphic counting; threshold support for counting; verifiability; information security

Link / DOI: https://doi.org/10.3390/cryptography10030034